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Abstract: This article evaluates the protection afforded to non-professional sureties in 
England and Wales.  In particular, this analysis considers how specific measures of 
protection have been developed to protect sureties in this particular legal, social and 
economic context.  More specifically, the article considers how the democratisation of 
credit, the decline in social welfare protection, the significance of judicial policy in 
consumer bankruptcy and the development of doctrinal principles and statutory 
protections regulating the surety contract interlink to shape the ‘sphinx’ of surety 
protection in England and Wales. 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This article aims to unpack, map and evaluate the protection afforded to non-
professional sureties in England and Wales.  In particular, this analysis considers how 
specific measures of protection have been effectively developed, or not, to protect 
sureties in this particular legal, social and economic context.  More specifically, the 
article considers how the democratisation of credit, the decline in social welfare 
protection, the significance of judicial policy in the context of consumer bankruptcy 
and the development of both doctrinal principles and statutory protections regulating 
the surety contract interlink to shape the landscape of surety protection in England 
and Wales. 
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The Characteristics of Suretyship Transactions 
 
At the outset it is useful to outline the essential characteristics of suretyships and the 
complex landscape in which they operate.
1
  This is a delicate task for suretyships are 
frequently only precariously demarcated from other types of ‘guarantees’ and 
demarcation problems have generated both litigation and legislation.  For example, as 
demand guarantees are held to be independent of the underlying principal contract, a 
demand guarantor cannot make use of all of the defences available to a surety.  Yet 
the express words of a suretyship contract will also often exclude or restrict the 
operation of surety defences.  This has led some to the view that the area is better 
characterised as an unstable spectrum of guarantees, with no general rule applicable to 
all guarantees and with the meaning of a particular agreement to be determined by the 
court on a case-by-case basis.
2
  
 
The basic characteristics of the surety contract can be briefly summarised: 
 
 The surety guarantees a sum/performance which the debtor/principal owes to 
the creditor; 
 The agreement between surety and creditor is often unilateral; 
 A suretyship is an agreement of secondary and accessory liability;  
 The surety’s liability is subsidiary to the principal debtor’s duty to settle, and 
accessory to the liability and existence of the principal debt;  
 The guarantor’s liability is conditional and co-terminous: if the principal’s 
liability is reduced, then the guarantor’s liability is reduced pro tanto;  
 Traditionally the creditor owed no duty towards the surety. 
 
In England and Wales there has been a consciousness that some sureties need 
protection.
3
  This is particularly so in the context of non-commercial suretyship 
transactions where: 
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  There is often proximity between the surety and the principal debtor – for 
example through familial relations;  
 The proximity between the surety and the principal may engender relational 
pressures; 
 The surety would classically be in a weak position as regards the creditor; 
 The suretyship transaction is typically not to the (direct) financial advantage of 
the surety. 
 The surety runs a risk, which is, perhaps, greatest where a business loan is 
guaranteed. 
 Where the potential liability involved is not in proportion to the surety’s 
income and assets, this may lead to an indefinite obligation rebounding on the 
surety following the principal debtor’s bankruptcy. 
 
Mapping Surety Protection in England and Wales
4
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  The idea of pursuing legal scholarship though the development of taxonomies is not without its 
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http://ssrn.com/abstract=925129. Sherwin considered two competing models of legal taxonomy: 
(1) the ‘reason based taxonomy’ applied by Professor Birks, whereby legal rules and decisions are 
classified according to ‘legal principles’, and the resulting taxonomy is employed to determine 
future decision making, and (2) ‘formal taxonomy’, a process by which efforts are made to classify 
legal materials according to rules of order and clarity.  Sherwin noted that while reason-based 
taxonomy seeks to identify ‘high-level decisional rules’, formal taxonomy ‘serves less ambitious 
objectives, such as facilitating legal analysis and communication’.  For formal taxonomy, the key 
objective of mapping legal provisions, principles or decisions was articulated by Sherwin as a 
based in a recognition that: ‘[c]lassification plays a necessary role in legal analysis: to think and 
argue clearly about law, we need to organize the raw material of legal rules and decisions into 
more general categories.’  
Given the polycontextual
5
 nature of suretyship transactions the cartography of surety 
protection is complex.  Surety protection in England and Wales is bifurcated: while 
contract law provides some measure of protection for sureties in certain 
circumstances, these protections are posed against a backdrop of low social welfare 
protection, and – despite legislative provisions which have sought to redress the 
balance – a strong pro-creditor bias in judicial approaches to property law provisions 
concerning creditor and debt, and in insolvency law.  These contextual factors have 
important implications for the overall level of surety protection in England and Wales. 
 
II. PROTECTION AFFORDED BY THE LAW OF CONTRACT 
 
Regulation of the Contracting Process 
 
It is axiomatic that the law of England and Wales does not recognise a generalised 
duty of good faith.
6
 Nevertheless the contracting process is regulated through the 
vitiating factors which will be illuminated in this section. 
 
Improper Pressure 
 
In recent years, a not uncommon complaint from sureties has been that the transaction 
was procured by improper pressure.
7
  In the context of non-professional suretyship 
transactions, improper pressure claims seem largely to be channelled through the 
doctrine of undue influence
8
 and this would seem to be a reflection on both the fact 
that undue influence is a wider doctrine than duress and it is more adept at dealing 
with the more surreptitious types of pressure which may arise in a relational context.  
Yet the doctrine of undue influence is elusive and there is vigorous debate about the 
jurisprudential basis of the doctrine. In particular, Professors Birks and Chin argued 
that undue influence is about impaired consent and that “it is not necessary for the 
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party claiming relief to point to fraud or unconscionable behaviour on the part of the 
other.”9  By contrast, one of the current authors has argued that undue influence is 
based on a notion of unconscionability with clear parallels to the unconscionable 
bargain doctrine,
10
 which will be discussed later in this paper. 
 
Whatever the true jurisprudential basis of undue influence might be, it is clear that the 
most common role of the doctrine is to regulate pressure in personal relationships.  
Such relationships may
11
 or may not
12
 be familial in nature.  Although undue 
influence may take many forms,
13
 it is possible to identify familiar situations.  At one 
end of the spectrum are cases where a pre-existing relationship makes one person 
more susceptible to pressure from the other
14
 or where the pressure would not be 
objectionable outside of a personal relationship.
15
  At the other end of the spectrum 
are cases where one person defers their will to another.
16
 The centre ground is 
occupied by a myriad of situations where there is no “routine dependence or 
submissiveness…”17 nor “unpleasantness”18 but the complainant can show that: 
“…(a) the other party to the transaction… had the capacity to influence the 
complainant; (b) the influence was exercised; (c) its exercise was undue; (d) its 
exercise brought about the transaction.”19 
 
For many years it has been customary to make a distinction between actual undue 
influence and presumed undue influence.  Actual undue influence referred to 
situations where the complainant could affirmatively prove undue influence,
20
 and, as 
such, it might be expected that the mainstay of actual undue influence would be cases 
concerning acts of (improper) overt pressure. The concept of presumed undue 
influence is much more mysterious, not least because the nature and rationale(s) 
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behind the presumption, if indeed it is a true presumption, is far from clear.  In the 
light of Barclays Bank v. O’Brien it seemed that undue influence would be presumed 
where (a) there was a relationship of trust and confidence between the parties,
21
 and 
(b) the parties entered into a transaction which was manifestly disadvantageous to the 
complainant.  As regards the former requirement, there were some relationships 
which, as a matter of law, were deemed to be relationships of trust and confidence, 
thus reducing the difficulty of establishing a presumption of undue influence.  Such 
relationships, known as 2A relationships, included the relationship between a parent 
and an unempancipated child,
22
 and the relationship between a medical advisor and 
advisee.
23
  It did not include the relationship between a husband and a wife
24
 which, 
in common with other relationships not coming within 2A, had to be shown to be a 
relationship of trust and confidence in each individual case (a so-called 2B 
relationship). 
 
The notion of a manifestly disadvantageous transaction has been particularly 
problematic in the context of suretyship transactions,
25
  and in Barclays Bank plc v. 
Coleman
26
 Nourse LJ questioned whether such a requirement should be removed.
27
 
Take, for example, the stereotypical case where a wife agrees to act as surety for her 
husband’s business debts.  Is such a transaction manifestly disadvantageous to the 
wife?  In one, perhaps narrow, sense the answer must be affirmative; the wife is 
guaranteeing the debts of another, often without direct benefit.  Yet, in another, wider 
sense the wife may be getting a very real indirect benefit if the fortunes of the 
husband and wife are intertwined.  The difficulties are amplified where, for example, 
the wife has a shareholding in the business which the husband runs.
28
 
 
In Royal Bank of Scotland v. Etridge
29
 the House of Lords had an opportunity to 
grapple with some of the issues surrounding the so-called presumption of undue 
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influence.  In that case Lord Nicholls
30
 painted the so-called presumption of undue 
influence in terms of an inference of undue influence; the complainant establishes a 
prima facie case of undue influence, which transfers the evidential burden to the other 
party to dissuade the Court from making an inference of undue influence.  On such an 
analysis, the precise nature of the relationship between the parties as well as the 
transaction is crucial.  Yet, surprisingly in the light of this approach, none of Their 
Lordships really engaged with the question of why some relationships, formerly 
referred to as 2A relationships, are automatically deemed to be relationships of trust 
and confidence.  As regards the requirement that the transaction had to be manifestly 
disadvantageous to the complainant, Lord Nicholls felt that the phrase ‘manifest 
disadvantage’ was apt to mislead.  Therefore for the future the relevant requirement 
would be whether the transaction, failing proof to the contrary, was only explicable on 
the basis of undue influence.
31
  Significantly, in the context of the stereotypical case 
outlined above, Lord Nicholls did not think that a wife acting as surety for her 
husband’s debts would normally satisfy this requirement.32 
 
Where a suretyship transaction has been procured by the undue influence of the 
creditor, the surety will, subject to certain bars, be entitled to have that transaction set 
aside.  By contrast, where the suretyship transaction has been procured by the undue 
influence of the debtor the position is more complex.  In such cases the courts must 
balance both the interests of the surety and the creditor in the light of any public 
interest.
33
  Prior to the landmark decision of the House of Lords in Barclays Bank plc 
v. O’Brien34 there was some confusion as to the vehicle that would be employed to 
balance these interests.  Since that decision, however, it has been clear that an 
innovative, if unconventional, use of the doctrine of notice was the chosen vehicle.  
Henceforth, where a suretyship transaction had been procured by undue influence of 
the debtor, the surety would, subject to certain bars, only be entitled to have that 
transaction set aside if the creditor either had actual or constructive notice of the 
debtor’s misconduct.  
 
                                                 
30
    ibid at [16]. 
31
    [2001] UKHL 44 at [29]. 
32
    [2001] UKHL 44 at [30]. 
33
   [2001] UKHL 44 at [34]-[37]. 
34
   [1994] 1 AC 180. 
Constructive notice refers to situations where a creditor is deemed to have notice of 
the debtor’s misconduct by virtue of a failure to take certain steps, whether or not the 
creditor has actual knowledge of the debtor’s misconduct.  A creditor will be required 
to take certain steps in this context if they have been ‘put on notice’.  In O’Brien Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson stated: 
 
“…in my judgment a creditor is put on inquiry when a wife offers to stand 
surety for her husband’s debts by the combination of two factors: (a) the 
transaction is on its face not to the financial advantage of the wife; and (b) 
there is a substantial risk in transactions of that kind that, in procuring the wife 
to act as surety, the husband has committed a legal or equitable wrong that 
entitles the wife to set aside the transaction.”35 
 
Subsequently there was some debate both as to whether the creditor was only put on 
notice where it, for example, knew that the relationship between the husband and wife 
was one of trust and confidence, and how to apply this test to other types of 
relationship.  Thereafter the principle was refined in Etridge where Lord Nicholls held 
that a creditor is always put on enquiry where the relationship between the debtor and 
the surety is non-commercial and this is known to the bank. 
 
Once the creditor is put on enquiry, it must take steps to minimise the risk of undue 
influence.  Failure to take appropriate steps saddles the creditor with constructive 
notice of any undue influence.  Again the House of Lords went on to elaborate the 
position of creditors in Etridge.  In particular, Their Lordships laid down a procedure 
for future surety transactions, requiring that creditors obtain from the surety’s solicitor 
confirmation that the surety had understood the documentation.  The creditor was 
obliged to supply the surety’s solicitor with information on the underlying loan and 
the principal debtor’s indebtedness to enable the solicitor to advise the surety.36  
Specific criteria, ‘core minimum requirements’ applying to both creditors and their 
legal advisers in all non-business third-party security cases have thus been elaborated 
                                                 
35
    ibid at 196. 
36
  ibid Lord Nicholls at para 79; D. Morris, ‘Surety Wives in the House of Lords: Time for Solicitors 
to ‘Get Real’?’ (2003) 11 Feminist LS 57. 
from Etridge.
37
  The Law Society has issued guidelines for solicitors on the basis of 
these core minimum requirements, including a draft letter to the spouse standing 
surety.  These guidelines are available on the Law Society’s website.38 
 
Informational Problems: Misrepresentation and Non-Disclosure 
 
Contracts of suretyship are not contracts uberrimae fidei
39
 and, therefore, the creditor 
is not under a duty of full disclosure.
40
  Nevertheless, there may be two situations 
where a creditor is under a duty of disclosure, albeit a limited one.  First, there is a 
growing body of case law which recognises that a creditor may be under a duty to 
disclose unusual features of the transactions.
41
  The ambit and implications of this 
limited duty are still being worked through.
42
  Secondly, there may be situations 
where non-disclosure contributes to an implied misrepresentation.
43
 
 
Where a creditor has induced
44
 the surety to enter into the suretyship transaction by an 
express or implied misrepresentation, the surety may, subject to certain bars, have the 
transaction set aside.
45
  By contrast, where the suretyship transaction has been 
procured by the misrepresentation of the debtor the suretyship transaction will only be 
set aside if the creditor had notice under the O’Brien/Etridge principles. 
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Vulnerability: Questions of Capacity and Unconscionability 
 
Suretyship transactions are, of course, subject to the normal contractual rules 
governing capacity.
46
  In addition, a surety with particular vulnerabilities may receive 
some protection through the unconscionable bargain doctrine.
47
  Although this 
doctrine is of respectable antiquity,
48
 in modern times it has tended to lead an 
understated life in this jurisdiction.
49
  A useful starting point is the judgment of Peter 
Millett QC in Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v. Total Oil GB Ltd.
50
  In that case the learned 
judge stated: 
 
“…if the cases are examined, it will be seen that three elements have almost 
invariably been present...  First, one party has been at a serious disadvantage 
to the other… Secondly, this weakness of the one party has been exploited by 
the other in some morally culpable manner…And third, the resulting 
transaction has been… overreaching and oppressive.  In short, there must… be 
some impropriety, both in the conduct of the stronger party and in the terms of 
the transaction itself…”51 
 
A number of points need to be made in connection with this statement.  First, it is 
clear that the unconscionable bargain doctrine is built upon the concept of a ‘special 
disadvantage’.52  In the past, “poverty and ignorance”,53 necessity,54 mental 
deficiency
55
and drunkenness
56
 have all constituted such a disadvantage.  Yet the 
process by which a disadvantage is recognised as a ‘special disadvantage’ is shrouded 
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in mystery.
57
  Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that the courts have taken a 
conscious decision not to elaborate on the concept of a ‘special disadvantage’.58 
 
Secondly, Peter Millett QC was clearly of the opinion that there needed to be a causal 
connection between the complainant’s special disadvantage and the resultant bargain, 
a view which is prevalent in the relevant case law.
59
  However, there is another, albeit 
less common, approach evident in the case law, which one of the current authors has 
labelled as a ‘status approach’.60  Under such an approach the courts appear, 
somewhat surprisingly, to have the power to relieve certain sections of society from 
improvident bargains regardless of whether there is a causal connection between their 
‘special disadvantage’ and the resultant bargain.61 
 
Thirdly, the view that the stronger party must act in a “morally culpable manner” is 
intriguing, not least because it sits uncomfortably with some of the seminal decisions 
on the doctrine.  For example, in Baker v. Monk
62
 Turner LJ gave the following, 
valuable insight into the doctrine: “I say nothing about improper conduct on the part 
of the Appellant; I do not wish to enter into the question of conduct… I am content to 
believe that in this case there has been no actual moral fraud on the part of the 
Appellant in the transaction.”63 
 
Indeed it seems that Peter Millett QC imported this requirement from case law 
concerning collateral advantages in mortgage transactions,
64
 a line of authority that 
has traditionally been considered sui generis.
65
  Yet, whatever the origin of this 
phrase, its significance is dubious; it is not unarguable that such a requirement is 
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satisfied merely by showing, for example, a causal connection between a 
complainant’s special disadvantage and the resulting bargain.66 
 
Fourthly, it is clear that Peter Millett QC was of the view that substantive 
unconscionability was vital to the operation of the unconscionable bargain doctrine, 
although such a view is not beyond challenge.
67
  Yet, even if we accept the view of 
Peter Millett QC on this point, the application of this requirement to suretyship 
transactions is not unproblematic.  As we noted earlier, in a sense, a pure suretyship 
transaction is always manifestly disadvantageous - if we may borrow that phrase - to 
the surety as they are guaranteeing the debts of another.  However, the courts have not 
adopted such a strict stance in analogous situations.  For example, in Portman 
Building Society v. Dusangh
68
 - a case where an old, illiterate man mortgaged his 
home to support the business ventures of his son – central to the Court of Appeal’s 
refusal to utilise the unconscionable bargain doctrine was the view that the transaction 
was not to the manifest disadvantage of the father.  In reaching this view, Simon 
Brown LJ stated: 
 
“…it was not manifestly disadvantageous to this appellant that he should be 
able to raise money by way of re-mortgage so as to benefit his son…I would 
agree... But I simply cannot accept that building societies are required to 
police transactions of this nature to ensure that parents… are wise in seeking 
to assist their children…In short, the conscience of the court is not shocked.”69 
 
This was echoed by Ward LJ: 
 
“So it was a case of father coming to the assistance of the son.  True it is that it 
was a financially unwise venture… and the father’s home was at risk.  But 
there was nothing… which comes close to morally reprehensible conduct or 
impropriety.  No unconscientious advantage has been taken of the 
father’s…paternal generosity…The family wanted to raise money: the 
building society was prepared to lend it.  One shakes one’s head, but with 
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sadness and with the incredulity at the folly of it all, alas not with moral 
outrage.”70 
 
By contrast, in Crédit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v. Burch
71
 - a case where a 
young, junior employee acted as surety for her employer – the Court of Appeal were 
clearly of the opinion that the transaction could have been set aside under the 
unconscionable bargain doctrine if that doctrine had been pleaded.
72
  Millett LJ stated: 
 
“This transaction cannot possibly stand… The transaction was not merely to 
the manifest disadvantage of the respondent; it was one which, in the 
traditional phrase, “shocks the conscience of the court”.  The respondent 
committed herself to a personal liability far beyond her slender means, risking 
the loss of her home and personal bankruptcy, and obtained nothing in return 
beyond a relatively small and possibly temporary increase in the overdraft 
facility available to her employer...”73 
 
Even from these short passages, it is clear that the courts are engaged in difficult 
socio-culturally charged decisions related to the acceptability of particular suretyship 
transactions in particular contexts. 
 
Finally, it must be remembered that suretyship transactions are tripartite transactions.  
Therefore, where it is alleged that the debtor’s unconscionable conduct has induced 
the transaction, recourse has to be made to the O’Brien/Etridge principles to 
determine whether or not the creditor is infected by such conduct.
74
 
 
Formative Regulation 
 
A certain degree of protection is afforded by the formalities required in suretyship 
transactions.
75
  In particular, the Statute of Frauds 1677, s.4, renders suretyship 
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party to be charged therewith…”  In addition, the Consumer Credit Act 1974, ss.105-
106, specifies certain formalities and requires the provision of certain information in 
respect of securities provided in relation to regulated agreements.
76
   
 
Regulation of the Terms of the Suretyship Transaction 
 
The traditional view is that the law of England and Wales is not concerned with 
substantive fairness in contracts.
77
  However, a numbers of caveats need to be entered 
against this view in respect of suretyship transactions.  First, substantive unfairness 
may sometimes be an essential component in establishing a vitiating factor.
78
  For 
example, as is illustrated by Dunbar Bank plc v. Nadeem,
79
 if undue influence is 
based on a notion of unconscionability, the relevance of the substantive fairness of the 
transaction will not merely be evidential. 
 
Secondly, the principles of construction of suretyship transactions may also impact on 
the substantive fairness of the transaction.  Traditionally, for example, the courts have 
taken a strict approach to construction when determining the extent of the surety’s 
liability.
80
  However, it should be noted that the principles of construction have been 
refined in recent years
81
 and this might
82
 impact on the traditional approach to 
construction in suretyship transactions. 
 
Thirdly, suretyship transactions are, in theory, subject to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act 1977 (UCTA) and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999 
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913. 
82
   cf Liberty Mutual Insurance Co (UK) Ltd v. HSBC Bank plc [2002] EWCA Civ 691 [56] Rix LJ: 
“the reasonable man does not expect fundamental principles of law, equity and justice, such as 
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(UTCCR). The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977
83
 may regulate attempts to exclude or 
limit a creditor’s liability under a suretyship transaction.84  Yet UCTA 1977 does not 
generally regulate clauses – commonly referred to as exclusion clauses – which seek 
to exclude or limit a surety’s right to be discharged; such clauses aim to preserve the 
surety’s liability rather than to exclude the creditor’s liability.85   
 
Meanwhile, the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999 apply, with 
some exceptions,
86
 “to unfair terms in contracts concluded between a seller or a 
supplier and a consumer”87 and if applicable to suretyship transactions, it may be that 
a number of common exclusions would be vulnerable.  Yet, the sui generis nature of 
surety agreements works to compromise application of the UTCCR to suretyships. 
Regulation 3 defines a seller/supplier as “any natural or legal person who…is acting 
for purposes relating to his trade, business or profession…”  By contrast, a consumer 
is defined as “any natural person who is acting for a purpose which is outside his 
trade, business or profession.”  The problem, of course, is that while the non-
professional surety may supply a service, he or she is usually not acting in the course 
of a business; and the creditor, as beneficiary of the agreement, is clearly acting in the 
course of business.
88
  
 
Protection Afforded to the Surety during the Currency of the Suretyship 
Transaction 
 
In addition to the protection inherent in the accessory and secondary nature of the 
surety’s liability,89 a surety will be afforded a measure of protection during the 
currency of the suretyship transaction through a mixture of contractual principles.
90
  
However, there is no general principle that the creditor must not act in a way that is 
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prejudicial to the surety.
91
  Moreover, the courts have been reluctant to impose a duty 
of care on the creditor to look after the economic interests of the surety.
92
 
 
III. CONTEXTUAL FACTORS 
 
Suretyships may be either personal or proprietary, but to the extent that social welfare, 
property law and insolvency provisions exist to protect sureties in England and Wales, 
they are generally associated with proprietary security.  In England and Wales, most 
sureties take the form of a security against real property, in many cases, the surety’s 
home.  However, these provisions are also relevant even in cases in which the debt is 
only personally guaranteed by a surety, as a creditor may be able either to bring 
bankruptcy proceedings as an unsecured creditor, or to seek ex post facto 
securitisation of the debt under the Charging Orders Act 1979, thus enabling the 
creditor to access the full range of remedies available to secured lenders under 
English law.  Ultimately, whether the surety is personal or proprietary, a creditor may 
instigate proceedings for bankruptcy to ensure satisfaction of the debt, and the low 
level of protection afforded to sureties in the context of bankruptcy is evident in the 
explicit judicial policy whereby the court has determined to order the sale of the 
bankrupt’s property, including property that is a family home, whether the creditor’s 
security was obtained ab initio or following the issue of a changing order by the court, 
unless the circumstances are truly exceptional.
93
   
 
This section will outline the legal framework that regulates creditor actions against a 
surety’s property, as well as setting out the scope of social welfare protections for 
surety’s and other debtors in England and Wales.   
 
Social Welfare 
 
The provision of state-sponsored social welfare support to alleviate the impact of 
surety liabilities and other debtor default has declined considerably in recent decades, 
so that, to the extent that social welfare may have traditionally provided a ‘safety-net’ 
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against default on liabilities, it is now generally regarded as ‘unsafe’.94  After the 
creation of the ‘welfare state’ in Britain general social welfare provision for either 
principal debtors or sureties who experienced difficulties in meeting their liabilities 
took two main forms: the indirect assistance afforded by tax relief against mortgage 
payments, and the safety-net provisions which entitled debtors to claim assistance 
with their housing costs when their income fell below a specified level.  Provision for 
mortgage interest tax relief was established before World War II, but the significance 
of this tax exemption naturally grew with the expansion of homeownership, and what 
Lord Diplock characterised as the: ‘…emergence of a property-owning, particularly a 
real-property-mortgaged-to-a-building-society-owning democracy’;95 in the second 
half of the twentieth century.  However, just as the democratisation of credit and the 
rising proportion of home owners seeking to claim mortgage interest tax relief meant 
that mortgage interest tax relief was on the cusp of becoming a potentially widespread 
and significant welfare support for debtors, the government took steps to limit its 
availability.  The decline in mortgage interest tax relief provision began in 1974, 
when relief was withdrawn for mortgage debts over £25,000; further reductions were 
made in 1991, until it was finally abolished in 2000.   
 
The principal legislative framework for state ‘safety-net’ provision for debtors was 
introduced under the National Assistance Act 1948, and was aimed at ‘persons unable 
to manage for themselves’ financially.96  The National Assistance Act 1948 marked 
the final shift from the ‘Poor Law’ approach to poverty and debt, which applied a 
policy of deterrence, to a social security perspective.
97
  Within the framework of the 
modern British welfare state, the most potentially relevant area of social welfare 
provision for non-professional sureties is, in theory, social protection in the event of 
insecurity; however, the degree of protection afforded to sureties in the event of 
financial insecurity is extremely limited.  This ‘safety-net’, which now includes both 
welfare benefits and tax credits, covers a range of circumstances including low 
income, childcare, unemployment, persons incapable of working due to illness or 
disability, pensioners and widows or widowers, and when sureties fall within one of 
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these categories, they may be entitled to social assistance benefits.  However, the 
approach adopted towards more specific surety protection through social welfare 
protections in recent decades can be usefully illustrated by the changes in policy 
towards social assistance for mortgage payments.   
 
In England and Wales, the form of security taken in a non-professional suretyship is 
usually a mortgage or re-mortgage of the surety’s home and, in theory, the British 
welfare state has, since 1948, provided for welfare payments relating to housing for 
those who qualified for social assistance benefits.  In the case of tenants, this took the 
form of a rent allowance (‘housing benefit’) while for owner occupiers, this could 
include assistance with mortgage payments (known as ‘Income Support for Mortgage 
Interest’).  However, the nature of this state-sponsored safety net provision in Britain 
has changed dramatically in the last decade.  Following a substantial policy departure 
in 1995, which restricted Income Support for Mortgage Interest in various ways – 
including the circumstances in which assistance could be claimed, and the total loan 
amount covered - the responsibility for coping with debt, default, and economic 
‘distress’ has been clearly shifted onto borrowers.  The widespread privatisation of 
safety net provisioning in Britain means that debtors are now generally expected to 
protect themselves through private insurance policies, such as Mortgage Payment 
Protection Insurance (MPPI), Critical Illness Insurance, Permanent Health Insurance, 
and Unemployment Insurance, as well as drawing upon personal savings, reserves in a 
flexible mortgage and employee benefits.  It is only when these avenues of relief are 
exhausted that the residual role of the state-sponsored social welfare system comes 
into play.
98
   
 
The decline in state-sponsored provision for defaulting principal debtors or sureties 
can be characterised as part of a: ‘…wider context of the restructuring of welfare and 
the ideological preference of successive governments (both Conservative and now 
Labour) to limit state welfare in favour of market provision and public/private 
partnerships.’99  At the heart of this private market approach is the assumption that 
                                                 
98
  J. Ford, D. Quilgars, R. Burrows, D. Rhodes, Homeowners Risk and Safety-Nets: Mortgage 
Payment Protection Insurance (MPPI) and Beyond (London: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 
2004), at 4. 
99
  J. Ford, R. Burrows & S. Nettleton, Home Ownership in a Risk Society: A social analysis of 
mortgage arrears and possessions (Bristol: Policy Press, 2001), at 85. 
borrowers will act rationally within the market place.  It is noteworthy, however, that 
up-take has been lower than anticipated, and it was recently reported that: ‘…there 
remains a considerable disjuncture between the expectations of the government, 
lenders and insurers with respect to MPPI and the research evidence on the 
effectiveness of the policy.’100   
 
The extent of social welfare provision afforded to the owner-occupied sector is 
usefully contextualised in a report published by the Council of Mortgage Lenders, 
which compared state-sponsored support for the housing costs of poor households 
living in owner-occupied and in rented properties.
101
  This study indicated that while 
households living in poverty are spread equally across the owner-occupied and rental 
sectors, with half the poor owning and half renting, the degree of financial support 
each sector receives from the state varies dramatically.  Taking 1998-99 as an 
example, it was noted that while low-income tenants received support (in the form of 
housing benefit) amounting to £11.2 billion in a year, support to low-income home-
owners (in the form of ISMI and improvement grants) amounted to less than £1 
billion.  Thus: ‘…while low-income home-owners are half the poor, they get just 8% 
of the benefits.’102  This is significant against a backdrop in which the 
‘democratisation of credit’ through the expansion of home ownership - thus giving 
potential sureties an asset against which to secure credit – has provided a significantly 
larger constituency of owner-occupiers who are potentially in a position to act as non-
professional sureties, and so also potentially exposed to the risk of creditor action in 
the event of the debtor’s default.  The erosion of state-sponsored safety-nets reflects a 
significant retrenchment in the social welfare system in England and Wales as it is 
likely to apply to non-professional sureties.  
 
Creditor possession actions and bankruptcy provisions 
 
The protections afforded to sureties under bankruptcy laws and other provisions 
relating to creditor actions against real property in England and Wales are also 
extremely limited.  Firstly, it is worth noting that the legislative provisions and 
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judicial principles that determine the ability of a creditor to bring a successful action 
for the possession or sale of an occupied home are scattered across different areas of 
law, including provisions for the regulation of co-owned land, mortgage law and 
bankruptcy law.  However, regardless of the legal context, one overwhelmingly 
consistent trend can be identified in English law: that regardless of the principles or 
provisions invoked by the creditor’s action, once a debt is shown to be well-secured 
against the property, the claims of creditors are routinely elevated over those of 
debtors and sureties.   
 
The main protection extended to sureties in this context is the essentially procedural 
requirement that - in the event that a creditor elects to exercise a remedy - the creditor 
must act for proper purposes and in good faith.  As the Court of Appeal noted in 
Yorkshire Bank plc v. Hall:
103
  
 
“…a mortgagee’s duty to the mortgagor or to a surety depends partly on the 
express terms on which the transaction was agreed and partly on duties (some 
general and some particular) which equity imposes for the protection of the 
mortgagor and the surety.  The mortgagee’s duty is not a duty imposed under 
the tort of negligence, nor are contractual duties to be implied.  The general 
duty (owed both to subsequent incumbrancers and to the mortgagor) is for the 
mortgagee to use his powers only for proper purposes, and to act in good 
faith…The specific duties arise if the mortgagee exercises his express or 
statutory powers…If he exercises his power to take possession, he becomes 
liable to account on a strict basis (which is why mortgagees and debenture 
holders operate by appointing receivers whenever they can).  If he exercises 
his power of sale, he must take reasonable care to obtain a proper price.” 
 
This focus on the conduct of the sale reflects the reality that, in most cases, a creditor 
with a valid surety against real property will, in the event of default by the debtor, 
have such express or statutory powers as will enable it, without undue difficulty, to 
take possession and force the sale of the surety’s property and so realise its capital 
value to discharge the debt.   
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 The legislative provisions and judicial principles that determine the ability of a 
creditor to bring a successful action against a surety to recover the principal’s capital 
debt are scattered across various areas of English law, ranging from the regulation of 
co-owned land to mortgages, from bankruptcy law to family law.  The form that these 
proceedings will take depends on several factors: whether the surety is a single 
individual or part of a ‘family unit’; whether the action for sale of the surety’s home 
arises in the context of bankruptcy proceedings; whether the debt is secured by way of 
a mortgage or some other form of proprietary security; whether the disputed property 
is solely or co-owned; and whether the property is occupied as a dwelling house, as a 
matrimonial home, or as a ‘family home’.  The form of the specific action brought by 
the creditor will be determined by these factors.  Furthermore, the principles by which 
the outcome of a case will be decided vary from one form of action to another.  In 
some contexts, the law has appeared to show greater sympathy for the protection of 
the surety’s home – for example, in the context of bankruptcy, some additional 
provision is made for properties that are designated as ‘family homes’.104  However, 
although the English legislature and judiciary have, at various stages and in the 
context of different legislative frameworks and judicial principles, addressed specific 
aspects of creditors actions against those who are liable for the debt, including 
sureties, these disputes have generally been viewed within specific contexts and 
without, generally, giving any explicit consideration to the overall balance struck 
between the claims of creditors and the interests of occupiers.   
 
Yet, despite the absence of a single coherent policy approach for creditor/occupier 
conflicts, particularly in relation to the basis of any protection afforded to sureties vis-
à-vis creditors, one overwhelmingly consistent trend can be identified.  Regardless of 
the specific context of the creditor’s action, legislative and judicial policies have 
ensured that the interests of creditors are routinely elevated over those of sureties and 
other debtors.  In fact, to some extent, any purportedly protective provision is likely to 
be of little practical value since a disappointed creditor will still hold the trump card 
of invoking bankruptcy proceedings against the surety in order to recover the debt.  
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The decision in Alliance and Leicester Building Society v. Slayford,
105
 highlighted the 
fact that even when the surety’s interests might prevail over those of the creditor in 
one discrete context, for example where an occupier who has joint ownership of the 
property is able to successfully establish the priority of their interest over that of the 
creditor, a number of avenues remain open to the creditor.  So long as the debt is well 
secured against the surety’s interest in the property, a creditor may continue to 
proceed against the surety’s ‘share’ of the property.  Ultimately, a creditor may 
instigate proceedings for bankruptcy to ensure satisfaction of the debt and, as 
indicated below, in the context of bankruptcy the court has determined to order sale 
unless the circumstances are truly exceptional.  Two matters are worthy of note: 
firstly, any evaluation of the balance struck between creditors’ claims with those of 
non-debtor occupiers must adopt a holistic approach; and secondly, the outlook for 
the occupier is not good.   
 
One consequence of the fact that little attention has been paid to achieving a more 
explicit and holistic policy approach to conflicts between creditors and sureties is that 
the overall consequences of the current ad hoc regime on each party’s interests have, 
to  a certain extent, been obscured.  The complexity of the law in this area, and the 
way in which a surety may clear one hurdle, only to fall at the next, has distracted 
attention from the fact that the creditor has a range of alternative routes by which to 
achieve his goals.  Ultimately, when the range of actions open to the creditor is 
viewed in the round, it is apparent that the surety’s interests are marginalised by the 
weight attached to the interests of the creditor.   
 
It is also interesting to note that in many of the cases considered below, the court 
exercises a discretionary power: whether to order the sale of a property at the request 
of a secured creditor; whether to delay possession proceedings so as to allow the 
debtor some time to make good on default; whether to grant a charging order for an 
unsecured creditor, thus opening up the possibility of further actions against the 
property; whether to allow the trustee in bankruptcy to realise the asset represented by 
the bankrupt’s family home.  When the court is called upon to exercise a discretionary 
power, that involves weighing the interests of the creditor against those of the 
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occupier, it is, as Nourse LJ acknowledged in Re Citro: ‘…very hard to see how they 
can be weighed against each other, except in a way which involves some value 
judgment on the part of the tribunal.’106  Across the range of creditor actions available 
under English law, it is clear that this value judgment is exercised in favour of the 
creditor.  
 
The statutory powers available to a creditor who brings proceedings against a surety 
vary depending on whether the property against which the action is brought is owned 
solely by the surety, or jointly by the surety and a co-owner.  Where property is 
owned by a single individual and the mortgagee is seeking to realize the capital 
represented by their security, they may either conduct an out-of-court sale, or seek a 
judicial order for sale of the property.  One defining characteristic of solely owned 
(although not necessarily solely occupied) property is that, in relation to sale, the 
court may not even be called upon to weigh the interests of the creditor in selling 
against the interest of the surety in retaining the property, as the creditor may have an 
automatic out-of court right to sell the occupier’s home.         
 
A mortgagee will have an automatic power to conduct an out-of court sale where the 
mortgage was made by deed, and the criteria set out in sections 101-103 of the Law of 
Property Act 1925 (LPA) have been satisfied.  Section 101 provides that the power of 
sale arises once ‘the mortgage money has become due’, that is, after the legal date of 
redemption, as specified in the mortgage deed. The power of sale becomes exercisable 
whenever one of three conditions is satisfied:  
(i) notice requiring payment of the mortgage money has been served on 
the mortgagor or one of two or mortgagors, and default has been made 
in payment of the mortgage money, or of part thereof, for three months 
after such service; or  
(ii) some interest under the mortgage is in arrear and unpaid for two 
months after becoming due; or 
(iii) there has been a breach of some provision contained in the mortgage 
deed or in this Act, or in an enactment replaced by this Act, and on the 
part of the mortgagor, or of some person concurring in making the 
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mortgage, to be observed or performed, other than and besides a 
covenant for payment of the mortgage money or interest thereon.
107
 
The regulations are clear: so long as the requirements set out in sections 101-103 are 
satisfied, the mortgagee is entitled to sell the property, and does not need to seek the 
approval of the court.  The mortgagee is automatically empowered, in these cases, to 
convey good title to the purchaser of the land, thus effectively converting their 
security interest in the debtor’s home into capital.  
 
Even when the conditions set out in sections 101-103 of the Law of Property Act 
1925 are not satisfied, where the surety is the sole owner of a property, the creditor 
can still seek an order for sale from the court by making an application under section 
91(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925, which provides: ‘…a [judicial] power to 
authorise sale “in any action” on “such terms as the court thinks fit.”’108  In exercising 
its unfettered discretion, there is some support for the proposition that the court will 
look beyond financial matters, to take account of ‘social considerations’, although 
there has been no reported case to date in which such arguments have been 
successfully advanced to prevent the sale of property under section 91(2).
109
  On the 
other hand, if the surety is a co-owner, an application for sale must be made under 
section 14 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, which 
replaced section 30 of the Law of Property Act 1925.  Although the court’s discretion 
to order sale under section 30 was also unfettered, the policy of the court was to order 
sale at the creditor’s request in the vast majority of cases.   
 
Many of the applications brought under section 30 were made by trustees in 
bankruptcy, acting on behalf of the bankrupt’s creditor(s).  In bankruptcy cases, the 
court adopted a particularly stringent approach towards section 30 applications, 
developing a principle that the discretion to order sale should be exercised unless the 
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circumstances were exceptional.
110
  Even where the property was a family home, the 
court held that: ‘[b]ankruptcy has, in relation to the matrimonial home, its own claim 
to protection.’111  The prospect that both the bankrupt and the bankrupt’s family 
would be rendered homelessness and unable to acquire another mortgage were not 
sufficiently exceptional circumstances to justify refusing an order for sale to a trustee 
for bankruptcy,
112
 or even for delaying the execution of the order.
113
  The prevailing 
approach was that: ‘…where there are debts outstanding, a sale should be ordered’;114 
and that: ‘…one must be just before one is generous.’115   
 
Even when section 336 of the Insolvency Act was enacted, with a view to providing 
greater protection for the family home in the context of bankruptcy proceedings, the 
commercial interests of creditors continued to prevail.  Section 336(4) of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 required the court, when exercising its discretion to order the 
sale of a ‘family home’, to have regard to a range of factors, including:  
 
“…the interests of the bankrupt’s creditors, the conduct of the spouse or 
former spouse…the needs and financial resources of the spouse or former 
spouse, the needs of any children, and all the circumstances of the case other 
than the needs of the bankrupt.”116 
 
Yet, while this provision purported to provide the court with grounds on which to 
recognise the interests of the debtor’s family in retaining their home, it was tempered 
by section 336(5), which required the court, once a year had passed from the 
instigation of bankruptcy proceedings, to: ‘...assume, unless the circumstances of the 
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case are exceptional, that the interests of the bankrupt’s creditors outweigh all other 
considerations.’   
 
The courts also played an important role in copper-fastening the preference for high 
creditor protections after the enactment of the Insolvency Act 1986.  Judicial policy 
with regard to applications for sale brought by trustees in bankruptcy under section 30 
of the Law of Property Act 1925 was epitomised by the decision of the Court of 
Appeal in Re Citro (a Bankrupt),
117
 when Nourse LJ concluded that, notwithstanding 
the factors set out in section 336(4), section 336(5): ‘...was intended to apply the same 
test as that which has been evolved in the previous bankruptcy decisions, and it is 
satisfactory to find that it has.’118  The Court of Appeal consolidated the approach 
adopted in the previous authorities, stating the general rule that trustees in bankruptcy 
ought to be granted an order for sale unless the circumstances were exceptional.   
 
This strict approach has subsequently been extended beyond bankruptcy, to cases 
involving other secured creditors.  Firstly, in Lloyd’s Bank Ltd v. Byrne119 the Court 
of Appeal held that: ‘...there is no difference in principle between the case of a trustee 
in bankruptcy, and that of a chargee.’;120 and in Barclay’s Bank Plc v. Hendricks121 
this approach was also extended to cases where the creditor’s security was obtained 
through a judicially imposed charging order.  Thus, in any action brought by a 
creditor against the surety’s land, whether bankruptcy proceedings have been 
instigated or not, and whether the liability was initially personal or proprietary, the 
courts developed a policy of ordering sale at the request of a creditor, unless the 
circumstances were exceptional.   
 
With the enactment of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, the 
court’s discretion to order sale under section 30 was superseded by a new discretion 
under section 14.  Yet, although the section 14 discretion was accompanied by a list 
of factors to be considered by the court,
122
 which appeared to encourage greater 
                                                 
117
  [1991] Ch 142. 
118
  ibid at 159, per Nourse LJ. 
119
  [1993] 1 FLR 369. 
120
  ibid, at 375. 
121
  [1996] 1 FLR 258. 
122
  The factors are set out in section 15 of the 1996 Act, and included regard for the intentions of the 
person who created the trust, the purpose for which the trust was formed, and the welfare of any 
consideration of the context and consequences of ordering sale, these legislative 
changes have had only marginal impact on the outcome of creditor actions.
123
  Indeed, 
following the 1996 Act, the courts have, with little exception,
124
 continued to favour 
the creditor’s interest in forcing sale.125  For example, in TSB Bank plc v. Marshall,126 
Judge Wroath held that: ‘...the interest of the chargee will prevail except where there 
are exceptional circumstances.’127  A similar approach has been adopted in the 
bankruptcy context: the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act inserted 
section 335A into the Insolvency Act 1986, thus extending to the new regime the 
protection for family home that was ostensibly provided by section 336; however, 
section 335A also replicates the presumption that when an application for sale is 
brought more than one year after bankruptcy proceedings are instigated, the court 
must order sale unless the circumstances are exceptional.  Furthermore, the court has 
only accepted circumstances as ‘exceptional’ in the most extreme of cases: to date, 
sale has only been delayed in cases where an occupier of the property is suffering 
from a serious illness, as in Judd v. Brown
128
 when the court held that: ‘…a sudden 
and serious attack of cancer was an exceptional event…and was clearly 
distinguishable from problems such as organising substitute housing or rearranging 
children’s schooling.’129   
 
                                                                                                                                            
minor occupant, as well as the interests of any secured creditor.  Section 15(3) also directed the 
court to consider the interests of persons of full age entitled to interests in possession – that is, 
adult co-owners - with a consideration of the value of their interests.   
123
  Even during the drafting of the Act, the Law Commission suggested that its provisions would: 
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of Land, (Law Com No. 181, 1989), para 12.9). 
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  ibid; see also Claughton v. Charalamabous [1999]1 FLR 740, where the bankrupt’s wife suffered 
from renal failure and chronic osteoarthritis, which imposed severe restrictions on her mobility; 
and Re Raval (A Bankrupt) [1998] 2 FLR 718, where the court allowed a postponement due to the 
wife’s paranoid schizophrenia, notwithstanding that the condition was long term and of 
indeterminate duration.  The court took account of the impact which ‘adverse life events’ such as 
moving to less suitable accommodation could have on Mrs Raval’s health, and postponed the order 
for a year to enable suitable alternative accommodation to be found. 
The emphasis on creditor protections, rather than protection for sureties or other 
debtors, was also evident in Bank of Ireland Home Mortgages Ltd v. Bell,
130
 when 
Gibson LJ reasoned that:   
 
“…a powerful consideration is and ought to be whether the creditor is 
receiving proper recompense for being kept out of his money, repayment of 
which is overdue…it is plain that by refusing sale the judge has condemned 
the bank to go on waiting for its money with no prospect of recovery…and 
with the debt increasing all the time, that debt already exceeding what could 
be realised on a sale.  That seems to me to be very unfair on the bank.”131 
 
At present, the landscape of English law clearly prioritises creditor claims over 
protections for sureties or other debtors.  Yet, the determination with which the courts 
have adopted this pro-creditor stance may in itself present a possible avenue for future 
challenge.  In Barca v Mears,
132
 the court considered the court’s policy of ordering 
sale in bankruptcy cases unless the circumstances were exceptional, in light of Article 
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which includes the right to respect 
for home.  Although the court concluded that, on the facts, the Deputy Registrar’s 
decision to order sale had been appropriate, the judge stated that the statutory 
provisions may be compatible with the Convention: ‘…without the possibly undue 
bias in favour of the creditors’ property interests embodied in the pre-1998 case 
law…’133     
 
IV. SYNTHESIS: THE SPHINX OF PROCEDURAL PROTECTION 
 
In this paper we have sought to explore and uncover the standard of surety protection 
in England and Wales. We have demonstrated that the approach to surety agreements 
appears, at least at first blush, to be mainly pro-creditor and that such protection as 
exists is largely procedural in nature.   Yet this procedural protection is enigmatic: it 
might be interpreted as providing little protection to the surety, setting hoops which 
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the creditor can easily jump through in order to hold the surety to his/her guarantee; 
on the other hand it might be argued that it encourages creditors to be pro-active by, 
for example, ensuring that independent advice is given. A further paradox of 
protection is that suretyships take their place in a broader spectrum of guarantees and 
a layering of protective mechanisms. This means that changes to the level of surety 
protection may be rapidly translated by the marketplace into new practice: enhancing 
surety protection may reduce resort to suretyships and increase resort to demand 
guarantees. Thus in seeking to ensure higher protective levels for sureties we may 
effectively reduce access to prime credit. Furthermore, when viewed comparatively, 
the level of surety protection achieved by different legal orders is heavily influenced 
by culturally specific attitudes to debt, levels of social welfare and the legal 
elaboration of insolvency procedures; thus each EC Member State looks to its own 
‘sphinx’ in surety protection. The age-old linkage of remedies and rights in the 
common law – ubi remedium, ibi ius – is an aspect of this, conditioning an instinct to 
locate protection in adjectival law and to resort to substantive protection only when 
confronted with unambiguous market failure. A further paradox emerges from the fact 
that some mechanisms simply do not work as one might expect: the Etridge due 
diligence parameters were developed by the Courts rather than the credit institutions, 
despite the fact that creditors should have an economic self-interest in due diligence 
independent of any statutory regulatory framework. In this synthesis we briefly 
describe the parameters defining the bounds of surety protection.   
 
In the first instance a surety receives some protection through the secondary and 
accessory nature of suretyship liability.  In addition, in England and Wales suretyships 
are regulated through a medley of legal doctrines and principles.  As we have seen, 
these doctrines and principles tend to have strong procedural and formative flavours.  
By contrast, less emphasis is put on the regulation of the terms of suretyship 
transactions.  Moreover, the culture of private insurance rather than social welfare 
against economic distress and the strong pro-creditor bias that characterises judicial 
policy in disputes between creditors and those who have provided security for a 
transaction (whether primary debtor or not) has meant that the social welfare, property 
law and insolvency protections afforded to sureties in England and Wales are also 
relatively low.   
 
The contrast to the more ‘continental’ approach is striking; rather than stringent 
statutory standards controlling ‘exemption’ clauses, a dedicated law on surety 
agreements, a focus on substantive justice or, even, the constitutionality of 
disproportionate guarantees, the approach in England and Wales pursues a case-law 
driven, pragmatic, procedural approach with emphasis on the parties’ freedom of 
contract and the importance of high creditor protections to ensure continued 
willingness to lend, thus safeguarding the availability of credit supplies.  
Fundamentally, as McCormack observes, this approach upholds individual autonomy 
rather than constitutionalising this area of private law.
134
   This is echoed in Parry’s 
view that the English approach discloses a more pragmatic, less moralistic approach 
to debt and that this is connected to a matrix of considerations which vary 
considerably from one European state to the next - the extent to which credit has been 
‘democratised’, the availability of consumer bankruptcy mechanisms and the extent of 
social welfare provision.   
 
Central to the protection of sureties in England and Wales is the notion of undue 
influence, the application of which in this tripartite context is not without difficulty: 
typically the suretyship transaction is procured by the undue influence of the debtor, 
not the creditor.  In such circumstances, the surety is usually only entitled to have that 
transaction set aside if the creditor either had actual or constructive notice of the 
debtor’s misconduct.  As we have seen, constructive notice refers to situations where 
a creditor is deemed to have notice of the debtor’s misconduct by virtue of a failure to 
take certain steps, whether or not the creditor has actual knowledge of the debtor’s 
misconduct.   
 
Therefore, the circumstances in which a creditor will be fixed with constructive notice 
of the debtor’s misconduct will be an essential factor in determining the extent of 
surety protection in England and Wales.  In O’Brien and then Etridge, the House of 
Lords elaborated the steps incumbent upon the creditor to avoid being fixed with 
constructive notice.  Essentially the creditor must “…take reasonable steps to satisfy 
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itself that the…[non-commercial surety]…has had brought home to her, in a 
meaningful way, the practical implications of the proposed transaction.”135  One way 
in which this may be achieved is by requiring the surety to obtain legal advice on the 
nature and risks involved in the transaction, and then for the solicitor to certify to the 
creditor that independent advice has been given.
136
  In such cases, it is not essential 
that the solicitor acts for the surety alone.
137
 
 
In Etridge Lord Nicholls candidly acknowledged that the O’Brien principles were an 
imperfect compromise.
138
  Nevertheless, the procedural rules established in O’Brien 
and Etridge can be criticised on a number of counts.  First these cases can be 
criticised on the ground of possible conflicts of interest: the solicitor charged with 
advising the surety may find it difficult to avoid a conflict of interest where he/she 
serves two masters.  Secondly, the Etridge approach can also be criticised for not 
focusing on the surety/creditor relationship but, instead, of focusing on the 
‘constructive notice’ in the principal debtor/creditor relationship in order to free the 
surety of liability against the creditor largely because there is no other way of dealing 
with the situation.
139
  Thirdly, it can be argued that the steps which a creditor needs to 
take to avoid being fixed with constructive notice, which are much clearer following 
Etridge, are not onerous.  Although more time is required to assess the impact of 
Etridge, on such a view, the level of the protection afforded to sureties in England and 
Wales seems much reduced.   
 
However the adjectival approach adopted under the law of England and Wales might 
be underestimated; it may indeed offer a lower threshold of protective intervention 
and more flexible remedies than many of the more constitutionally or substantive 
justice oriented continental systems of law.
140
 As we have seen, a suretyship 
transaction may be set aside where (a) the debtor has exercised undue influence over 
the surety and (b) the creditor is fixed with constructive notice of the debtor’s 
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misconduct; importantly the former can be presumed and the latter can spring from 
the mere fact that the relationship between the debtor and the surety is non-
commercial in nature.  Yet this is only part of the story; following Etridge creditors 
are now, to an extent, incentivised to be pro-active in all cases of non-commercial 
sureties. By way of contrast, the German approach institutes a high threshold for 
intervention, which focuses on life-long indebtedness rather than the surety’s home 
ownership.
141
  What the German courts look for, rather than undue influence, is an 
excessive or gross disproportion between the guarantee and the surety’s income and 
assets.
142
  This may begin to explain why suretyship transactions are far less 
ubiquitous in England than in Germany: reducing the effective protection provided by 
the substantive justice approach means that creditors find suretyships more attractive 
in Germany than in England.  By extension, less resort is thus made of other types of 
guarantee; with the result that access to credit is, arguably, more broadly and 
diversely ensured on better conditions.
143
  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Consideration of the remedies afforded to creditors by property law and under 
insolvency provisions has indicated that, once the creditor has cleared the hurdle of 
establishing a valid contract for surety, the English courts are almost always rigorous 
in ensuring that the creditor can then pursue the debt, to the point of instigating 
bankruptcy and forcing the sale of the surety’s assets, including their (family) home.  
Accordingly, general contractual vitiating factors – and in particular undue influence - 
are the main source of surety protection in England and Wales.  Yet it can be argued, 
notwithstanding Etridge and the procedural safeguards established therein, that no 
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matter how much information is supplied, it will always be insufficient.  Sureties will 
still enter into agreements out of love, dependency or vulnerability.  The acid question 
is whether it is more efficient in such cases to trust more in procedural requirements 
directed at the creditor, or to rely on approaches which focus more directly on defects 
in sureties consent and/or the substantive unfairness of the contract.
144
  It may also be 
disputed whether the procedural standards laid down in Etridge are stringent enough 
to protect the vulnerable surety, and that, instead, the steps identified simply map out 
the procedural hoops that the creditor has to master to be able to rely on the 
agreement.  Clearly further case law is required if these points are to be answered.  
Nevertheless, this is not a zero-sum game, and every choice entails costs and benefits.  
The problem with a lower trigger to intervention and an effectively higher standard of 
protection - as the proceduralised standard in Etridge may be suggested as leading to 
when compared, for example, with the constitutionalised (higher trigger, practically 
lower) standard of protection in Germany - is the potentially damaging effect this has 
on the resort to surety arrangements amongst the spectrum of guarantee 
instruments.
145
  Indeed a reduction in the prevalence of surety agreements may simply 
deflect problems related to social justice and access to credit to other areas of contract 
law. 
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